* Skept- changes topic to 'Presentation on the ideas of Noam Chomsky in progress

* Skept- sets mode: +m

<@Brouwer> Good evening. My presentation this evening is about some of the

ideas of Noam Chomsky.

<@Brouwer> Since he is often said to be the most quoted or even most

influential intellectual of the twentieth century, I might assume that no

justification for interest in his ideas was necessary.

<@Brouwer> But in fact, even if Chomsky were not as famous - or infamous -

as he is, philosophers would I think still have to give some of his arguments

careful consideration.

<@Brouwer> Tonight I want to describe one of his most interesting and if

true important ideas: the claim that there is an innate richly structured

cognitive faculty that accounts for our ability to learn human languages.

<@Brouwer> This faculty Chomsky calls Universal Grammar (UG). The first

germ of this idea appeared in public in the mid 1950s with a review by Chomsky of

an article about language learning by the behaviorist BF Skinner.

<@Brouwer> In that review Chomsky claimed that no behaviourist account of

learning could account for the acquisition of language by children. Indeed he

hinted then that only the assumption of an innate mental faculty could explain the

facts.

<@Brouwer> In his own view this put Chomsky firmly in the philosophical camp

of the rationalists.

<@Brouwer> Rationalism typically asserts that the mind is an active source

of knowledge, not necessarily dependant on experience.

<@Brouwer> while empiricists typically hold that experience is the only

source of knowledge

<@Brouwer> If Chomsky is right, then his Cartesian linguistics resolves this

dichotomy of views in favour of a at least a weak version of rationalism: the mind

is an active source of at least some kinds of knowledge.

<@Brouwer> Beofre I sketch the argument that Chomsky uses to motivate his

claim for an innate universal grammar, I want to dispel some common

misunderstandings about UG as he conceives it.

<@Brouwer> First, Universal Grammar is not represented in the brain in any

direct way.

<@Brouwer> Rather UG "falls out" as an indirect consequences of the brain's

structure, much in the way that arithmetic "falls out" of the structure of an

electronic calculator.

<@Brouwer> There is no representation of the laws of arithmetic inside the

calculator.

<@Brouwer> This is emphasised by Chomsky's insistence that UG does not

provide a model of how a speaker (or hearer) processes utterances; it is rather a

specification of what speakers know by virtue of knowing a language.

<@Brouwer> This point has been taken by some commentators as a route to

attack the idea that UG counts as an instance of innate knowledge. Whatever is

innate in this sense, some say, it doesn't have the propositional form required of

knowledge.

<@Brouwer> This criticism is sharpened by the observation that if knowledge

is construed as justified true belief then it is hard to conceive of what is in

Chomsky's view tacit knowledge - knowledge that cannot usually be articulated - as

belief.

<@Brouwer> A further misconception concerns the notion that the evidence

available to children learning their first language(s) is inadequate.

<@Brouwer> It is sometimes said that the language the child hears is often

ungrammatical consists of incomplete sentences and that that directed at the child

is deliberately simplified and doesn't exemplify some elements of the adult

target.

<@Brouwer> This characterisation of degraded input however is not what

Chomsky is concerned with when he talks about the evidence available to children

to learn language.

<@Brouwer> Even if the child were only exposed to perfectly grammatically

well articulated sentences covering all the constructions available to the adult

target language, then according to Chomsky she could still not decide on the basis

of this positive evidence alone on the correct grammar for the language in

question.

<@Brouwer> Chomsky motivates his Universal Grammar by a number of

observations, for example, that all normal human children will without any formal

teaching grow up speaking perfectly the language of the community they grow up in.

<@Brouwer> Thus, the ability is not specific to some rather than other

languages and is in this sense universal.

<@Brouwer> He notes that the learning is extraordinarily fast - most of it

is complete by the age of 5 years.

<@Brouwer> This is contrasted with the difficulty that adults have in

learning languages based on formal teaching.

<@Brouwer> Most importantly, he deploys "The Argument from the Poverty of

Stimulus".

<@Brouwer> I would suggest now that the floor be opened for questions and

comment for a short while and then I will sketch the form of the argument from the

poverty of stimulus and then give a concrete example from English.

<@Brouwer> Thank you all for your patient attention so far!

* Skept- sets mode: -m

<ironie> intresting so far Brouwer, thanks for your effort

<Lennodde> are there specific brain areas where truma indicates language

acquistion might reside?

<S|ye> is our genetic makeup not analogous to that of a symbiont?

<S|ye> that is, we are predisposed to allow language to develop, without

being born with the language itself?

<@Brouwer> Lennodde: trauma evidence for localisation of acquisition is

scarce and this maybe because of a certain plasticity in early neurological

development.

<marden> so far too many ill-defines - 'knowledge' itself, and the

distinctions between knowledge and language

<@Brouwer> marden: indeed. there is a serious philosophical objection that

Chomsky isn't talking about knowledge at all.

<Lennodde> Brouwer, what about trauma later in life?

<@Brouwer> after all, very few people could put their hand on their heart

and say they believe that english modal auxiliaries have no tense.

<marden> brouwer - warning - dennett in DDI has some harsh words on chomsky

:)

<@Brouwer> Lennodde: trauma evidence indicates that there is some

localisation of language function in the brain - this much has been known since

Paul Broca in the 19th century but more nuanced studies now show that the

localisation is very subtle and is accompanied at least in part by distributed

porcesses.

<@Brouwer> I think that the notion of "unconscious" knowledge is at least

odd, if you don't know you believe it do you really believe it?

<@Brouwer> If people have no further comments or questions I should like to

turn now to the Argument from the Poverty of Stimulus in more detail.

* Brouwer sets mode: +m

<Lennodde> Brouwer, have you heard of truama resulting in a person being

still able to speak but certain words/concepts can be written but not spoken?

#philosophy Cannot send to channel

<@Brouwer> Chomsky observes that children learn their native language

without any formal training being necessary and on the basis of positive evidence

alone.

<@Brouwer> By positive evidence he means just being presented with examples

in the environment but not with any negative feedback in the way of grammatical

explanations or discussions of why some sentence is not grammatical.

<@Brouwer> In other words the child deduces the nature of the target

language from examples of adult speech alone.

<@Brouwer> Given that there are facts about the adult target that are not

deducible from the data of speech examples this is a remarkable feat and requires

some explanation.

<@Brouwer> It is according to Chomsky a special case of Plato's Problem.

<@Brouwer> How do we know so much on so little available evidence?

<@Brouwer> A critic of Chomsky - Geoff Pullum - has reduced the argument

from the poverty of stimulus to a schematic form that may clarify matters

somewhat. I give an adaptation here.

<@Brouwer> There are five steps labelled here a to e.

<@Brouwer> a. Human infants learn their first languages either by

data-driven learning or by innately-primed learning.

<@Brouwer> [Disjunctive premise; by assumption.]

<@Brouwer> b. If human infants learn their first languages by means of

data-driven learning, then learning of principles which are not deducible from the

data will never be observed in this domain.

<@Brouwer> [Immediate, from the characterization of data-driven learning

methods.]

<@Brouwer> c. Learning of principles which are not deducible from the data

does in fact occur in the domain of first language acquisition by infants.

<@Brouwer> [Empirical premise asserted by Chomsky &co.]

<@Brouwer> d. Human infants do not learn their first languages by means of

data-driven learning.

<@Brouwer> [From (b) and (c) by modus tollens.]

<@Brouwer> e. Human infants learn their first languages by means of

innately-primed learning.

<@Brouwer> [From (a) and (d) by disjunctive syllogism.]

<@Brouwer> These five steps comprise the Argument from the Poverty of

Stimulus and in this form expose the architecture of the argument.

<@Brouwer> Of course empirical questions remain open.

<@Brouwer> My next goal this evening is to describe a particular phenomenon

in English that Chomsky claims demonstrates that the argument is sound.

<@Brouwer> Before I do that I will open the channel to questions and

comment. Thank you again for your attention.

* Brouwer sets mode: -m

<marden> i don't understand 'innately-primed' learning

<lakitu> Brouwer: have you any of the empirical examples mentioned in (c)

handy? ("Learning of principles which are not deducible from the data")

<marden> the opposite of point&grunt would be what?

<@Brouwer> marden: sorry I should have explained that term, it means

learning that relies on innate knowledge rather than just on experience.

<@Brouwer> lakitu: if you will indulge me I will give such an example in the

following section of the discussion.

<marden> how would this innate knowledge ( really means innate 'language'

doesn't it?) be or manifest without point&grunt?

<Lennodde> Brouwer, how do Chomsky's critics explain no other faculty of

even near the sophistication of language not being evident in humans so young?

<marden> (data-driven learning of language)

<lakitu> ok

<@Brouwer> But this question of empirical evidence is very important.

<marden> lakitu good point

<marden> language seems to be 2-parted - data/symbols and logical

arrangement of those symbols to coincide with the empirical experience of the world

<@Brouwer> Lennodde: I find it difficult to speak for his critics, but often

they argue that a) language isn't as formally complicated as Chomsky has it b)

that semantic functions prime the learning of grammatical distincions c) that

language isn't learned on positive evidence alone.

<Lennodde> Brouwer what would learning on negative evidence consist of?

<@Brouwer> marden: as to the manifestation without point and grunt, I think

it's an assumption that point and grun predate language both in ontogeny and

philogeny

<marden> brouwer 'language' is more than symbols - it's symbols carefully

arranged

<lakitu> if you think of "perfect grammar" as "most cogent

sentence-structures yet made"; this to me means that its likely that childern,

being extremely intelligent, can hear fragmented or even grammatically improper

sentences, & "put the pieces together" in some cases for themselves, rationalizing

what is 'proper' (cogent) in ways that are plausibly very similar to adults.

(even formulating their own naive grammatical rules, like "i draw

<@Brouwer> Lennodde: well in context it would mean not hearing examples that

appear to contradict principles of grammar or of negative feedback that decides

some hypothesis about grammar the child might be testing.

<@Brouwer> marden: I agree, that fact about arrangement will feature soon.

<marden> words & grammar - that's language - not 'body-language' or picking

out symbols on a page

<@Brouwer> lakitu: your observation I think prompts me to move on to an

example of just how the positive evidence proves inadequate.

<lakitu> & essentially, i have an innate & strong skepticism towards the

notion of innate knowledge.

<marden> the negative feedback would address behaviorism wouldn't it? there

doesn't seem to be a real mechanism for 'negative reinforcement' of language other

than preventing the child from speaking;hearing at all

<marden> lakitu me too - i don't like it

<@Brouwer> science is often the enemy of common sense ;)

<@Brouwer> I think that an example will clarify the points that people have

made - all of which have been well put.

<Lennodde> marden-lakitu, why the aversion to innate "anything"?

<@Brouwer> This is my last section of discussion and then I will open the

floor.

<marden> lennodde well - because...later :)

* Brouwer sets mode: +m

<@Brouwer> I now turn to a particular example of a principle underdetermined

by the avaiable evidence.

<@Brouwer> where the previous discussion has been general, this focuses on

some relevant linguistic data.

<@Brouwer> I will try to keep it as non-technical as possible. It is not a

particularly complicated dataset.

<@Brouwer> The evidence that Chomsky has claimed is *decisive* in his view

in favour of Universal Grammar concerns the formation of questions in English.

<@Brouwer> A certain class of English questions seem to be related to

statements by the movement of an element we call an auxiliary verb or auxiliary

for short.

<@Brouwer> So:

<@Brouwer> The dog is hungry

<@Brouwer> and

<@Brouwer> Is the dog hungry?

<@Brouwer> Children acquiring English as a first language do indeed begin to

formulate questions based on this model.

<@Brouwer> But how do they do so?

<@Brouwer> They don't only repeat questions that they have previously heard.

<@Brouwer> They seem instead to construct a principle or if you like a rule

for the formulation of these sorts of questions.

<@Brouwer> Allowing for the moment that the word "is" is an auxiliary

(whether it is or not has no bearing just now).

<@Brouwer> The rule might be "front the auxiliary"

<@Brouwer> meaning move it to the beginning of the sentence to form a

question form a statement.

<@Brouwer> You can try that rule on this example:

<@Brouwer> The man is angry

<@Brouwer> and you see that it works.

<@Brouwer> But this rule can easily be made to fail.

<@Brouwer> Consider this sentence

<@Brouwer> The dog that is in the corner is hungry.

<@Brouwer> Applying our rule we could get

<@Brouwer> Is the dog that in the corner is hungry.

<@Brouwer> which is not grammatical.

<@Brouwer> A few moments creative thinking and you will easily come up with

examples of more than two auxiliaries.

<@Brouwer> The dog that is in the corner that is not yet painted is hungry.

<@Brouwer> and so on.

<@Brouwer> The principle of grammar that is required to formulate a working

rule for the formation of these kinds of questions is not deducible from the

positive evidence alone.

<@Brouwer> (That is it is a piece of evidence required for c in our

schematic argument above)

<@Brouwer> The rule that works is

<@Brouwer> Front the auxiliary from the main clause

<@Brouwer> This rule is different because its formulation depends upon a

recognition that grammar is _structure dependant_.

<@Brouwer> (I leave main clause unexplained but I'll be happy to try to

explain it if people wish later).

<@Brouwer> Grammatical rules do not refer to the left right ordering of

atmostic words but to words groups together in structural relations.

<@Brouwer> We call these groupings constituents. Here are the constituents

from one of our examples:

<@Brouwer> [[the dog that is in the corner]is hungry]

<@Brouwer> The bracketing indicates the structure.

<@Brouwer> Now nothing in the positive evidence, the data presented to the

child indicates the existence of structure dependance.

<@Brouwer> But children learning English do indeed learn - and very quickly

- to form questions on this pattern.

<@Brouwer> So, structure dependancy is an innate predisposition.

<@Brouwer> Faced with language data the child is disposed by an innate

cognitive endowment to deduce only structure dependant rules.

<@Brouwer> At this point we have demonstrated what is required to prove

Chomsky right. We have a case where only innately-primed language learning can

explain the facts of language development. There are possible objections, but to

date those put forward have not to my mind suceeded in refuting Chomsky's argument.

<@Brouwer> There remain philosohical questions such as those I adverted to

earlier which may inform your discussion. Does the notion of tacit knowledge make

sense? Even if there were some innate disposition would it count as knowledge?

<@Brouwer> Even if this argument is sound, doesn't it infact only refer to a

very specialised kind of knowledge which is not properly knowledge about the world

independant of us and therefor leaves empiricism largely unscathed in the more

important arena of substantive human knowledge?

<@Brouwer> I hope that I have at least demystified one of the central

arguments of modern linguistics and that you will now feel able to discuss the

importance, or unimportance, the relevance, or irrelevance of Chomsky's claim that

there is an innate language faculty.

<@Brouwer> Thank you for your patience. I will be happy to try answer any

questions and I hope that I have not confused you all too much by my inadequate

powers of explanation.

* Brouwer sets mode: -m

<Lennodde> Well done

<marden> brouwer :)

<Lennodde> It seems to me, those who rebel at some aspect of behavior being

innate want humanness to be a sort of free-floating mystical essence divorced from

physical considerations (dualists)

<marden> interesting new (to me) area of wonderment

<Lennodde> marden, are you a dualist?

<marden> lennodde it's the opposite - it's the smell of mysticism that

attends to 'innateness' that puts me off

<marden> no

<@Brouwer> Lennodde: interesting Chomsky called his linguistics Cartesian

but I don't think he intended that as a commitment to dualism.

<marden> it's all got to connect for me

<xi> barking is inherent to dogs.. why wouldn't speech be inherent to humans

<xi> innate rather

<Lennodde> marden, innateness (gene programming) is the opposite of

mysticism, isn't it?

<marden> lennodde hmmm put like that - yes - but...

<marden> Dennett accuses chomsky of being a hankerer for skyhooks/mysticism

<Lennodde> what does marden accuse Chamsky of?

<@Brouwer> I find it difficult to see anything mystical in Chomsky's

position. The advantage of Pullum's schematic argument is that it shows how

ruthlessly rational the argument is.

<@Brouwer> Of course, it could still be *wrong*.

<Lennodde> Brouwer, yes, agreed

<Lennodde> agreed, that you're not wrong

<marden> 'innate' sounds like humans would speak without empirical

experience/data

<@Brouwer> marden: no, i mean the physiological basis of puberty is innate

but in cases of malnutrition for example sexual maturity may not happen

<@Brouwer> the environment has to activate the innate predisposition

<Lennodde> marden, the data can be without personal experience, in this

case, species experience ratcheted by evolution

<ironie> is there innate-ness? do we mean, when we are born we innately know

how to breathe, or do we learn it at the moment. we are designed to live, so it

can be construed that anything we need to live is innate within us, but i can't see

the point, nor the proofs

<@Brouwer> ironie: the question is rather about innate knowledge - and

Chomsky claims that the argument from the poverty of the stimulus demonstrates

that there must be innate knowledge in the case of language.

<xi> what behaviors are not innate?

<marden> yeah - it's hard to connect innateness with 'knowledge' - knowledge

being so dependent on objects

<@Brouwer> I don't think skateboarding is innate

<@Brouwer> or wearing cologne

<lakitu> Lennonde: re innate knowledge: for me, essentially what marden says;

i don't want to let the hell of mystical innate knowledge break loose unless my

back is against the wall.. it's only a small step from innate knowledge of

grammatical rules to divination, clairvoyance, etc.

<marden> 'language' also depends upon some object of knowledge - therefore -

'innate' seems too 'too'

<xi> If skateboarding is not innate then why do we do it?

<@Brouwer> lakitu: I sympathize to a degree - from grammar to intelligence

worries me. But I can't find any other way to answer the question that Chomsky

asks.

<marden> i'm not understanding what he mean by 'innate' language?

<@Brouwer> xi: we're taught to do it.

<marden> brouwer what is the q that chomsky asks?

<xi> we are taught language as well

<lakitu> basically; I'm thinking that the child's curiosity drives her to

(often) formulate the same rules as speakers who have already formulated proper

rules

<@Brouwer> QED: Chomsky is pretty insistent the the principles of Universal

Grammar are innate.

<Lennodde> marden, Chomsky would not say language is innate, rather it's

foundation as outlined by Brouwer is innate

<marden> xi i think that's the issue - we're taught 'the form' of something?

(language) we already have 'innately'

<QED> Hmm, I don't believe Chomsky believes innate 'knowledge' per se. He

believes in an innate capacity to apply rules (transformational rules of grammar).

<ironie> now specific innate knowledge just doesn't seem any more likely then

being born able to ride a skateboard, we are born with the potential, given a

healthy birth, but you don't mean potential for grammar, and i find it unlikely

<@Brouwer> xi: who taught you, for example, the rule concerning auxiliary

question formation in English?

<bxbomba> i agree

<marden> leonnodde i found brouwer's discussion fairly inoffensive

<marden> the part of language chomsky is talking about is the

logical/grammatical constructive part only?

<@Brouwer> QED: I don't think that characterization is quite right. The

principles of UG don't consist only in transformations but of proposition

knowledge of the kind that "all grammatical principles are structure dependant"

<QED> Brouwer: This capacity to parse sounds in according to rules is what

is said to be innate. It's not a kind of knowledge or know-how, it's a capacity,

an innate disposition.

<marden> qed that makes sense - i would connect that to the 'innate' 'logic'

of human experience/thought

<QED> Brouwer: I disagree. According to Chomsky, no one knows the rules. In

fact, that's the whole point of contemporary linguistics: coming to know and

understand a capacity that we have.

<@Brouwer> QED: I think we'd have to go look at Chomsky then, I would say

that the introduction to Aspects of the Theory of Syntax makes it clear that he

thinks his hypothesis is about knowledge - tacit albeit - and that it is decisive

against empiricist epistemologies.

<lakitu> yes, i think it's definitely more the Logic than innate,

prepackaged knowledge

<Lennodde> is some aspect of logic innate?

<@Brouwer> QED: but I would like to say, of course as I pointed out, this

knowledge isn't represented neurologically (and I admit that that is a bit of an

odd position to be in) it's a consequence of the language processing architecture.

<QED> Brouwer: I agree, we'd have to go to his writings to do a proper

exegesis. On my reading, nothing in the corpus of his work suggests that he thinks

that humans have a kind of occurent knowledge or understanding of the rules of UG.

He seems rather to think we are hard-wired to be able to parse according in such a

way that we can describe it AS IF we were consciously applying rules.

<Lennodde> innate meaning gene programming

<@Brouwer> (if anyone is interested the most relevant papers on the question

of representation and knowledge are in Asa Kasher _The Chomskyan Turn_).

<Lennodde> lakitu, would you allow some aspect of logic being innate?

<@Brouwer> QED: Right, I understand your point, my reposte is that strange

as it seems Chomsky insists nonetheless that UG is psychologically true.

<QED> Brouwer: Yes, he thinks it's a psychological fact, one for which we so

far lack any neurological foundation (and which we may never find).

<lakitu> Lennodde: .. it dependents what you mean by innate, but offhand,

Yes, logic is very innate in my mind

<Lennodde> <Lennodde> innate meaning gene programming

<@Brouwer> QED: agreed. I think the point we disagree on is whether a) we

can properly characterise UG as knowledge and b) whether Chomsky categorises it as

knowledge.

<@Brouwer> On a - I don't know I'm agnostic for the purposes of this

exposition. On b I just refer you to his book on the subject _Knowledge of

Language_ where he insists that we do have knowledge of the principels of UG.

<QED> Brouwer: I think he does sometimes refer to it as knowledge, but

that's in his more extemporaneous or looser expositions. In his more formal

exposition, he doesn't seem to think it's any kind of knowledge in the usual sense

of that word.

<Lennodde> lakitu, from innate logic, why is it too far a stretch to innate

grammar rules overlaying some rules of logic?

<lakitu> Brouwer: what do you mean by "language processing architecture" ?

is this the deep logic of the world, or a physical something in their brain? or

other? (i know you said not neurologically)

<QED> Well, we certainly do have knowledge of language. That's not at issue.

What we were discussing was whether the ability to apply UG is itself a form of

knowledge according to Chomsky.

<@Brouwer> QED: No I'm sorry, I will insist, he has written at least one

whole volume on the matter, which I've referred to. He also wrote the lengthy

introduction to Aspects of the Theory of Syntax where he discusses the

epistemological relevance of his hypothesis.

<@Brouwer> (I didn't mean by the way just the title of his praeger volume, I

meant the substantial argument in the book)

<lakitu> Lennondde: i actually am advocating that the child's curiosity

forces them to formulate a gram rule like others have, logically

<QED> Brouwer: I'm familiar with the work you're discussing. Again, I don't

think it's correct to describe his view as implying that we 'know' or 'understand'

the UG. We just apply it. What we know are the languages that we speak and hear.

<QED> Brouwer: Yes, I gathered that you were referring to more than the

title.

<@Brouwer> alas, I find myself being dragged away from the computer

prematurely. Thank you all for your attention and patience. I will be back soon

enough.

<QED> Brouwer: Same here. Sorry I didn't hear more. Bye.

<QED> Sounds like I missed a good one.

<Lennodde> lakitu, I think Brouwer made the case that learning comes up short in

explaining language acquisition, especially in those so young

<lakitu> yes, i think the distinction between implicitly "knowing" the

grammatical rules is very different from being able to explicate them; in fact,

for those implicit rules, i'd rather not say they Know that rule, but something

more along the lines that they formulated an instance of the rule, they

'implicitly understand it'

<lakitu> minus the yes there..

<Lennodde> lakitu, if you allow innate logic rules, why not go a little

further and allow some degree of innate grammar rules?

<Maestro7> Wouldn't Eistein's "Gulf Theory" apply here?

<Lennodde> What's the Gulf theory?

<lakitu> Lennodde: i'm essentially trying to say the grammatical rules are

an out growth of the logic being applied to words(, or sentence-formulation)

<marden> lakitu my thinking, yes

<Maestro7> Lennodde: The concept that pencils -- for example -- cannot

simply become so sentient as to begin talking with each other. Very similar to

what seems to be talked about here.

<Maestro7> Lennodde: It was an observation that humans seem to be a unique

species where not only do they communicate with each other, but they originate

thoughts as well and are able to manipulate those concepts.

<Maestro7> Anyway, just a thought.

<ironie> i keep hearing how behaviourisim is invalid and i realize people

don't seem to like it, but i am curious as to witch augment or set of arguments

put it away. I don't believe any have, i believe political correctness is the sole

arbitrater here

<Lennodde> lakitu, and I'm trying to say, along with Brouwer and Chomsky,

that grammar rules seem to be an innate _overlay_ of innate logic

<lakitu> i think grammatical rules are a direct consequence of logic, not

written into the brain in any sense; maybe you could say written into the "the

logic" of the world that determines the child's logic which determines their

formulation of even complex rules

<lakitu> Lennodde: what do you mean by overly?

<Lennodde> lakitu, the point is, they're innate in the same sense logic is

innate

<lakitu> Lennodde: agreed

<Lennodde> lakitu, by overlay, I mean a further sophistication of logic

<ironie> logic isn't innate, maybe, maybe, potential is, but it certainly

isn't proven

<Lennodde> ironie what has been proven?

<ironie> that logic is innate

<Maestro7> lakitu: In order to communicate, one must take the data of

thoughts and put them into a "cohesive" order in order for them to be communicated

and, hence, acknowledged. To me, that's a bit of a "by definition." The real issue

is how one goes about making these concepts "cohesive."

<Lennodde> ironie, Brouwer just layed out the evidence for innate grammar

rules

<ironie> there is no reason to think we don't learn by environmental exposure

<ironie> i don't find it at all convincing

<lakitu> not unlike (the infamous) Sheldrake morphological fields; the

innate tendencies of thinkers are logical in a certain sense

<Lennodde> this does not prove anything, it simply points to what is

apparently the case

<Lennodde> ironie, no one has made the case we don't learn by environmental

exposure

<ironie> that is the case though lennode

<Lennodde> the presentation was narrowed to one part of language acquisition

<Lennodde> lakitu, Sheldrake and logical should not be in the same sentence :)

<ironie> even there, it was presented that we have a predispositions to

learn the language, and it claimed that there were insufficient contextual cues. I

didn't see where that passes for proofs

<lakitu> Maestro: do you think grammatical rules are due to the logic, or

are they somehow biologically inherited?

<Lennodde> ironie, there are no proofs, short of mathematics

<Lennodde> but we should go in the direction evidence points us

<Maestro7> lakitu: Now that is quite the question. For the most part -- and

this is key -- I believe that grammatical rules are due to logic. However, the

actual ability to decipher concepts from the surrounding environment is

dramatically affected by biology.

<Maestro7> lakitu: In other words, I believe in both "nature" and "nurture."

<ironie> the evidence points us towards environmental as opposed to innate

<Lennodde> Maestro7, only a fool would argue either/or

<Maestro7> Lennodde: There are many fools available.

<Lennodde> of course both nurture and nature are factors

<bxbomba> do youu think that if you alter your language/logic your environment

will thus be effected

<bxbomba> or is that aspect static

<lakitu> I mean, there is surely a learned component to language; the only

question to me is whether there is an innate knowledge of the rules of

constructions of statements of the language, which I say no; because I am

interpreting "innate" alike "inherited", & I doubt inherited readymade knowledge.

I think they are formulated, but perhaps I am naive & need to see more empirical

examples of cases contra to this.

<bxbomba> so the observer is more in charge here

<Lennodde> bxbomba, putting on a shirt is altering your environment

<ironie> yes, lennode, but as to specific forms of innate knowledge, the case has

yet to be made

<Maestro7> lakitu: I'm rather biased towards your perspective, so I'm really

no good on what you've just said.

<Lennodde> ironie,  chomsky's case for universal grammar is well made

<Maestro7> Lennodde: Please define "universal grammar."

<ironie> so it is, it still remains unconvincing, at least to me,

<Lennodde> Maestro7, did you miss the presentation?

<Maestro7> Lennodde: Yes, I did. However, defining a concept should take

less than 5 minutes, else it needs to be further disseminated.

<Lennodde> <@Brouwer> Tonight I want to describe one of his most interesting

and if true important ideas: the claim that there is an innate richly structured

cognitive faculty that accounts for our ability to learn human languages.

<Lennodde> This faculty Chomsky calls Universal Grammar (UG). T

<lakitu> Maestro: re "the actual ability to decipher concepts from the

surrounding environment is dramatically affected by biology" : agreed, good

point.. I think since I think the same "innate logic"(=physical laws themselves)

of the world which determine the biology of the organism also determine the

thinking of the organism, i feel safe attributing formulation of grammatical rules

to the logic/physical laws.

<Maestro7> lakitu: True.

<Maestro7> Lennodde: I would have to whole-heartedly agree with the concept

of UG.

<Lennodde> Maestro7, ditto, with striking out whole-heartedly

<Maestro7> Lennodde: I.e.: there is an ability -- on the part of all humans,

categorically -- to be able to learn how to communicate verbally.

<Lennodde> lets leave some room for being wrong

<Maestro7> Lennodde: If there is evidence, absolutely.

<Maestro7> The ability to form things grammatically does not necessitate

that one is able to speak, say, German "from the womb."

<bxbomba> what about telepathy

<Lennodde> bxbomba, telepathy belongs in the category of nonsense

<Maestro7> Lennodde: With, of course, the ability to be wrong on the

"nonsensical" telepathy.

<Lennodde> Maistro7, notice it did not state Absolute nonsense

<Maestro7> Lennodde: Interesting. Thank you for pointing out the unknown

unknown in my mind of your concept of "absolute sense."

<Lennodde> you are welcome

<Maestro7> Or even nonsense, pardon.

<Maestro7> Lennodde: You are to be respected; you actually qualify your

langage. Excellent.

<lakitu> bxbomba: <bxbomba> do u think that if you alter your language/logic

your environment will thus be effected <--- that's interesting; do you mean

changing say the logic from the beginning,, or a sudden change? in the first

case, yes, I'd think everything would be different, (because i think the logic is

derived from the physical laws, which determines the environment); in the second

case: ,that'd be really weird!!

<Maestro7> Logic/environment changes, in my view, are quite situational.

I've also found that it is significantly easier to change one's environment to

produce a desired result than to simply change the logic of one's communications

streams.

<bxbomba> i like to relate the eastern way of thinking and the western ,

where they write and read left to right and vice versa,, and it seems our logic

goes in this manner too linear

<Maestro7> bxbomba: Good observation.

<Lennodde> bxbomba, what is the eastern way of thinking?

<Maestro7> bxbomba: However, in comparing eastern with western languages,

not only does the linear shift take place, but the logical representation does as

well.

<lakitu> oh nvm; i thought you(=bxbomba) were meaning 'linear logic'

compared to 'lateral logic'

<bxbomba> linear compared to chaotic

<lakitu> i'm hungry for more examples like those mentioned in Browuer's (c)

of that argument he outlined. ("The Poverty of Stimulus")

<lakitu> This innate-language business really seems to hinge on how

convincing those examples of supposedly-underivable grammatical rules are